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Ibn Taymiyyah, the Hanbali jurist and theologian, is said to have proclaimed that the sixty years’ 
reign by an unjust ruler was preferable to one night of anarchy. He further elucidated that an 
absolutist state was necessary for the protection of religion, and conversely the guidance of 
religion was a precondition for the prevention of tyranny. Perhaps Taymiyyah’s views come as 
no surprise when one considers that the scholar lived during an age of crisis in the Islamic lands–
one that followed on the heels of a prolonged period of dissolution of Abbasid absolutism and 
was exacerbated by the Crusades and, especially during Ibn Taymiyyah’s lifetime, by the 
cataclysmic Mongol invasions.1 Nonetheless, an analysis of the political events and religious 
developments during the period from the Abbasid golden age in mid-eighth century to the end of 
the Shi’i century in mid-eleventh century paints a more complex picture of the interaction 
between state absolutism and religion.   
The development known as “the Shi’i century” between the mid-tenth and the mid-
eleventh century—referring to the flowering of Shi’i doctrinal literature, as well as the rise of the 
Ismaili Fatimid caliphate in Egypt and the Twelver Shi’i regime of the Buwayhids in the central 
Islamic lands of Iran and Iraq2—and the codification of Sunni Islam around the same time period 
were made possible by a number of seemingly disparate factors. The political prominence of 
Shi’ism was helped by the dissipation of Abbasid absolutism, since the Baghdad regime had 
hitherto been extremely active in suppressing its political manifestations. The religious 
codification of Shi’ism, on the other hand, surprisingly had begun during the Abbasid golden age 
between the mid-eighth and the early-ninth century. The caliphate of the age, in marked contrast 
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to its insistence on political absolutism, had fostered unfettered cultural production. The regime 
had especially encouraged the outward flow of culture from Iraq, the centre of Shi’i literature 
and intellectual tradition. Significant though it was, the Fatimid patronage merely continued this 
tradition of Shi’i literary production and helped to refine Ismaili thought. Buwayhid support for 
Twelver ideas in Baghdad contributed somewhat to the development of Twelver Shi’ism as a 
system of belief and to the institutionalization of certain public expressions of the faith. Finally, 
in the face of the ascendency of Shi’i ideas, a rival Shi’i caliphate in Egypt, and de facto rule in 
the central lands by the Twelver-minded Buwayhids, the declining Sunni Abbasid caliphate was 
forced to codify Sunnism in an effort to politically unify the umma once again under an Abbasid 
banner and to delegitimize the Shi’i regimes. In effect, while state patronage was an undeniably 
important factor for the development and codification of the central tenets for both, the ongoing 
contestation between Shi’i and Sunni doctrines after the dissipation of Abbasid absolutism 
played a far more central role in their maturation process. 
 By the middle of the ninth century, the absolutist political tradition that the Abbasids had 
inherited from the Sasanian Empire reached its nadir. The regime’s absolutism had always been 
faced with political challenges from many quarters of Islamic thought, including the Kharijis and 
various Shi’i sects such as the Zaydis, Twelver Shi’is, and Ismailis. These opposing parties had 
markedly differing views on the ideal constitution and administration of the Islamic state. The 
Kharijis and the Zaydis, for example, were informed by a revolutionary impulse and inspired by 
the small-scale, face-to-face political communities of early Islamic caliphates that were built on 
the basis of the caliph’s personal responsibility towards the umma. The Ismailis, in sharp contrast 
to the egalitarian Kharijis, proposed a hierarchical regime. As believers of Batin—hidden or 
esoteric meaning— their system of rule would focus on an imam-ruler whose legitimacy was 
based on divine inspiration.3 As was the case with the other Shi’i groups, Twelver Shi’is 
concentrated on erecting a just and incorruptible political entity across the Islamic lands in which 
power would be concentrated in the hands of an imam descended from the family of Ali. They, 
however, believed that the last imam had gone into miraculous occultation and would only 
reappear before the end of the world to lead the umma. As a result, the Twelvers had a rather 
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uneasy relationship with the caliphate since its presence only served to underscore the caliph’s 
lack of divine inspiration and the caliphate’s illegitimate claim of rule over the umma. 
Nonetheless, as “quietists”, they rejected the activist tendencies of other Shi’i sects.4 
The middle Abbasid caliphate was particularly vulnerable to these calls for political 
reform because the prolonged civil war from 809 to 833 AD over succession claims had greatly 
weakened it.5 The war was followed by the formation of a unique military elite. The 
demographic make-up of the military was composed mostly of slave soldiers of Turkic origin, as 
well as mercenaries recruited from minority groups living in the fringes of the empire such as 
Daylamites, Armenians, and Berbers—was an unprecedented occurrence in the Islamic world. 
Additionally, its political power far outstripped the political influence exercised by previous 
military elites such as the Khurasaniyya army. Eventually the Turkish military leaders became 
the de facto leaders of the state, ushering in a new political tradition in which the Abbasid caliph 
became a mere figurehead, and the military commander, known as the Amir al-Umara, came to 
effectively rule the Islamic world.6 The Buwayhids would later utilize their Daylamite heritage in 
order to gain crucial support of the Daylamite infantry in the Abbasid army and benefit from the 
amir al-umara tradition to rule from Baghdad for roughly a century from 941 to 1048 AD.7 
Furthermore, the political position of the Abbasids was greatly worsened by the 
deteriorating economic condition and heightened social tensions. Historian Marshall Hodgson 
argued that economic failure contributed at least as much to the decline of the Abbasid 
absolutism as political failure.8 The agricultural economy of the Sawad in Iraq had been a central 
source of revenue for the Abbasid regime. A multiplicity of factors such as unfavourable 
geological changes in the Diyalah basin, salinization of the earth due to prolonged over-
cultivation of the land, and damage caused to the irrigation and canal systems during the civil 
war significantly lessened the return of both revenue and agricultural yield during the period in 
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question.9 The economic crisis magnified already-existing regional divisions and especially 
aggravated class antagonisms. A number of rebellions were launched independently in far-flung 
corners of the Abbasid Empire, yet relied on a similarly constructed message of erasing the class 
distinctions and founding an egalitarian, regionally-based Muslim society. Often these revolts 
were ideologically informed by the aforementioned political challengers such as the various Shi’i 
sects or the Kharijis. The series of small-scale rebellions by the Ismaili-minded Qaramita from 
897 AD onward is a prime example of such a social movement. The Qaramita revolts were 
believed to have been directed from the western edge of the Syrian Desert by the charismatic 
‘Ubayd Allah, who later capitalized on his mobilization experience and strong base of Ismaili 
followers in order to become the first Fatimid ruler in North Africa in 997 AD.10 
 In other cases, local rulers took advantage of the Abbasid administration’s weakness to 
become virtually independent principalities with regional economic and political autonomy. 
Such was the case in Egypt and Syria where, although they continued to acknowledge the 
Abbasid Caliph in name, the Tulunids and later the Ikshidids established independent dynasties. 
Even though the Fatimids rejected the previous two dynasties’ treaty arrangements with the 
Abbasids, they continued and improved upon the legal and economic systems developed during 
the preceding era.11 Thus, one can trace the origins of the two most prominent and powerful Shi’i 
regimes, the Ismaili Fatimids in Egypt and the Twelver-minded Buwayhids in Iraq and Iran, to 
the gradual weakening of the Abbasid absolutism between the ninth and tenth centuries.   
 The Shi’i century was marked by more than just Shi’i political dominance. It was also 
distinguished by the pre-eminence of Shi’i scholarship and literature and the development and 
codification of different systems of beliefs within Shi’ism. Hodgson accounts for the 
“disproportionate number of [Shi’i] scholars and littérateurs, even in fields other than explicitly 
religious” during this period by noting that a rich intellectual tradition was already entrenched in 
the Shi’i communities of Iraq. During the golden age of the Abbasid caliphate, the regime was 
extremely liberal-minded when it came to fostering unrestricted cultural production, and was 
especially focused on the diffusion of cultural products from Iraq to the rest of the Islamic 
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territories. Many of the old families of Iraq had inherited Shi’ism since it had been prominent in 
Kufa. As these families formed the upper bourgeoisie, mercantile class during the Abbasid 
period, they were also at the forefront of cultural production. Much of first and founding 
articulations of Shi’ism, such as the Nahj al-Balaghah or the compilation of Ali’s sayings 
collected by al-Sharif al-Radi, can be traced to the contributions of this particular class during the 
Abbasid golden age.12 As a matter of fact, the culture-cultivating power of the upper bourgeoisie 
families was discernible even during the Buwayhid period. In addition to cultural openness, the 
golden age of the Abbasids was manifested in the infusion of scholars from across the Islamic 
lands into Baghdad’s cultural scene. The increased social mobility during the Abbasid period 
meant that a scholar could, given certain talents, rise in social stature anywhere within the 
Islamic territories without the mediation of familial connections, tribal allegiances, or local ties.13 
The commercial district of al-Karkh thus became established as a principal stronghold for Shi’i 
scholarship during the early Abbasid period. In tenth century Baghdad, although the Buwayhids 
themselves did not patronize scholars housed in the district, the Shi’i merchant families close to 
the Buwayhid court formed the majority of their benefactors and continued to foster the 
production Shi’i religious literature, often with a Twelver flavour, at al-Karkh.14 
Hodgson further contends that while Fatimid patronage of Ismaili scholarship indeed 
produced substantial refinements, the Buwayhid contribution to the maturation of Twelver Shi’i 
tenets was possibly only of secondary significance.15 Although Hugh Kennedy disagrees with 
Hodgson’s assessment of Buwayhid involvement in the development of Twelver belief system—
for he contends that Buwayhid presence in Baghdad was instrumental for the development of 
Twelver Shi’ism “both as a system of belief and a religious community”16—both historians agree 
that the institutionalization of certain public expressions of Twelver beliefs was made possible 
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through Buwayhid benefaction. Public rituals and celebrations such as the public denigration of 
the first two caliphs, festivals commemorating the mourning for al-Husayn on his death 
anniversary on 10 Muharram and those celebrating the acknowledgement of Ali by the Prophet 
as his successor at Ghadir Khumm on 18 Dhul-Hijja, as well as the development of a pilgrimage 
tradition around the tombs of the members of the ‘Alid family, were first carried out in 
Buwayhid Baghdad; many of these rituals have since become part and parcel of modern-day 
Shi’i practice across the world.17 One potential reason for the particular public manifestations of 
Twelver belief system prevalent in Baghdad and much of Iraq and Iran during this time can be 
attributed to the fact that after a century and a half of Abbasid absolutism, the Shi’i community 
perceived a possibility to assert their difference and visibly separate themselves from the Jamah-
i-Sunni. Baghdad under de facto Buwayhid rule thus served as the perfect staging ground for this 
project of Shi’i differentiation. 
 One of the most interesting chapters of the Buwayhid rule in Baghdad concerns Abbasid 
caliph al-Qadir’s efforts to codify Sunni Islam. Al-Qadir was the twenty-fifth Abbasid caliph 
who served as a figurehead for the Buwayhid rulers from 991 to 1031 AD. Despite his 
powerlessness, al-Qadir was determined to stem the tide of infusion of Shi’i ideas in Baghdad in 
both the Twelver form through the encouragement of the Buwayhids and in the Ismaili form 
through the propaganda efforts of the Fatimid dais. The Abbasid caliph’s pre-occupations seem 
to have been twofold: first, he had wished to struggle against any religious doctrine, such as 
Shi’ism, Mu‘tazilasm, or A‘sharism, that was contrary to Sunnism; and second, he had aimed to 
reduce the threat to the Sunni Abbasid caliphate from Fatimid quarters through religious 
renunciation. The Caliph was especially vigilant against the reading of khutbas in the name of 
the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim in Iraq. When in 1010 AD the amir of al-Mawsli professed 
allegiance to al-Hakim and read the khutba in his name, al-Qadir immediately dispatched an 
emissary to the chief amir of the region to effect the restoration of the khutba in his name. 
Additionally, he wrote and read a manifesto publicly in his palace in November 1011 AD which 
questioned the legitimacy of the Fatimid claim of being descended from Ali and condemned the 
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Fatimid Ismaili doctrine as “an enemy of Islam.”18 His most significant and enduring 
contribution to the codification project was the text Risalaal-Kadiriyya. Written in 1018 AD, this 
text clarified “a Sunni doctrinal and ritual position to counter that of the Shi’i.19 By the time of 
his death in 1031 AD, the caliphate managed to regain some of the lost prestige because of the 
Caliph’s efforts to provide a definition for Sunni Islam against the advances of Shi’i ideas. 
However, this did not result in the reestablishment of the Abbasid caliphate’s political power. 
The refinement and institutionalization of Sunni Islam begun by the al-Qadir continued through 
to the Seljuk era. The system of madrassahs or Sunni colleges was devised by the famed Seljuk 
wazir Nizam al-Mulk in 1067 AD, and it soon spread throughout the Islamic territories and acted 
as bastions of Sunni learning.20 
 Even though Ibn Taymiyyah’s proclamation about an absolutist state nurturing religious 
ideas seems to be intuitively true, careful consideration of the the political and religious 
developments, specifically the struggle between Shi’ism and Sunnism, in the Islamic territories 
between the ninth and the eleventh centuries reveals quite a different picture. In fact, the 
dissolution of Abbasid absolutism contributed most significantly to the rise of the Shi’i political 
powers between the mid-tenth and mid-eleventh centuries in Islamic history. Religious 
codification of Shi’ism and production of Shi’i doctrinal literature, on the other hand, were more 
highly encouraged by the Shi’i community during the Abbasid golden age when the Sunni 
caliphate was experiencing the peak of its absolutism. Similarly, Sunni Islam was codified and 
institutionalized by a declining Abbasid caliphate to counter the perceived threat from the 
ascendant Shi’i political powers during the Shi’i century. Notwithstanding the importance of 
state patronage, it was in fact the contestation between the two doctrines that affected their 
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